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On the 22nd of December 2005 the Dutch Cabinet informed the Dutch parliament that the 
Netherlands would significantly contribute to the ISAF mission in the Afghan province of 
Uruzgan. The purpose of this mission was to support the Afghani government in rebuilding the 
country and to provide safety and stability for its inhabitants. Even though the Netherlands had 
supported the international mission in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005 with a relatively 
small number of troops, no mission of this size had been performed in Afghanistan yet. When 
parliament debated the decision on the 2nd of February 2006 the word “draagvlak” (support) was 
frequently mentioned, however, contrary to similar debates about contributing to the war in Iraq, 
“draagvlak” was defined as parliamentary support instead of public support in this debate 
(Everts, 2012, p. 107). This parliamentary support was present, as a large majority of 127 out of 
150 members of parliament voted in favour of the government’s decision to send a large number 
of troops to Uruzgan. However, public support was lower, and more negative, compared to the 
support for earlier missions (Everts, 2012, p. 107). When the mission was evaluated by a 
government commission in 2011, it was recommended that in future military missions a good 
media strategy should be developed by the ministries involved, in order to create larger public 
support for such a mission (Feith, Gruiters, Ruijter & Urlings, 2011). This recommendation 
stresses the importance of public support besides parliamentary support, by suggesting that a 
media strategy could influence the opinion of the population, and implies the belief that there is a 
connection between public opinion and the political elite in foreign policy issues. The questions 
that arise from the case of the Dutch decision to send troops to Uruzgan concern the existence 
and nature of this connection between the public opinion and the political elite. How does the 
public form an opinion on such issues?  
  The relevance of answering the question concerning the Dutch public opinion on the 
mission to Uruzgan can be deducted from the core tasks of the Dutch military. One of the three 
core tasks of the Dutch military is: “Protecting and promoting international rule of law and 
stability” (www.rijksoverheid.nl). Missions like the ISAF mission in Uruzgan are a central part 
of achieving this core task, and it is therefore likely that the Netherlands will participate in 
similar missions in the future. By studying the public opinion concerning the mission in 
Uruzgan, one of the largest and most recent examples of this type of mission, valuable lessons 
can be learned for similar future military missions.  
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Why does public opinion matter in foreign policy? 
Since the invention of the modern survey by Gallup, governments have increasingly used polls 
as means to measure the public opinion of their population, and more importantly their voters, on 
topics including foreign policy issues (Eisinger, 2008, p. 489). The increasing use of polls has 
sparked a debate on democratic legitimacy and the (possible) political responsivity to the wishes 
of the public; should a democratically chosen government listen to, and act because of (possibly 
flawed) data on public opinion between two elections? Apart from this normative debate whether 
or not a government should take the public opinion into account, which shall not be continued 
here, there is evidence that governments do so in practice. Researchers such as Wlezien (1995) 
have found a statistically relevant connection between public opinion and policy making, 
however, the exact nature of the responsiveness of politicians remains a matter of debate 
(Eisinger, 2008, p. 493). As mentioned before, Wlezien (1995) is one of the scholars to find a 
statistical relevant connection between foreign policy and public opinion. In his research he 
compares public opinion to a thermostat; when the public wants more or less spending in a 
certain policy area, signals are sent and received by the government, thereby restricting or 
enlarging the manoeuvring space of policy makers (Wlezien, 1995, p. 985-988). Different 
research by Powlick also found that politicians and government officials are influenced by, or at 
least informed of,  the wishes of the public on foreign policy (Powlick, 1995, p. 441). The results 
of studies, such as by Wlezien or Powlick, indicate that public opinion is a factor to be taken into 
account when investigating the forming of foreign policy.  
  Most research in this area, including aforementioned research by Wlezien and Powlick, 
has focused on the United States (Baum & Potter, 2008, p. 58). Some comparative research has 
taken place, for example by Isernia, Juhász and Rattinger (2002), that extended the conclusion 
that public opinion does have an effect on policy to Germany, France and the United Kingdom. 
One can expect that, because of the general cultural, geographical and geopolitical similarities 
between the Netherlands and the other four mentioned states, the effect of public opinion on 
foreign policy in the Netherlands also follows the same basic pattern. However, specific 
differences in public opinion are to be expected, as voting system and political parties, which 
will be commented on later, are not exactly similar in all cases.           
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 In order for the public to form an opinion, and exercise influence over government 
officials and foreign policy, the public needs to be reasonably well informed of the policy or 
policy alternatives. Without knowledge of the alternatives or possibilities, the public cannot send 
specific signals to the policy makers (Wlezien, 1995, p. 981). However, in the two decades after 
the second World War, research concluded that public opinion on international relations is (1) 
volatile and therefore not a stable basis to form policy on, is (2) not coherent and (3) it has little 
effect on foreign policy in the end (Holsti, 1992, 442). The third element of this so called 
“Almond-Lippmann consensus” has since than been challenged by studies including those by 
Wleizien (1995), Powlick (1995), and Isernia, Hosház and Rattinger (2002). These studies found 
evidence that policy makers and the policy’s themselves are influenced by the public opinion to 
some degree. Also the first two elements of the consensus have been researched and evidence 
has been found that public opinion is in fact quite stable, rational and coherent when aggregated 
into a single public opinion (Page & Shapiro, 1992). Research by Mueller into the wars in Korea 
and Vietnam showed for example that public opinion does not randomly change but reacted in a 
rational way on American casualties in both wars (Mueller, 1971, p. 367).  
  Also the second element of the Almond-Lippmann consensus is challenged by Holsti, 
concluding on the basis of several other pieces of research that, despite the apparent lack of 
information on foreign policy, the public can structure its opinion (Holsti, 1992, p. 446-448). The 
same conclusion is reached by Aldrich et al., stating that: “ the American public has coherent 
foreign policy attitudes and that it can—under some circumstances—translate those attitudes into 
choices at the ballot box” (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler & Thompson Sharp, 2006, p. 491). All 
in all there is enough evidence to reject the Almond-Lippmann consensus and to conclude that 
the public can overcome its lack of specific information and can form a stable and coherent 
opinion in the area of foreign policy. Furthermore, once formed, this public opinion can have an 
effect on policy makers and foreign policy. 
How does the public form an opinion? 
The question that arises from the fact that the public can form a stable and coherent opinion on 
foreign policy is; how exactly is this opinion formed? According to Holsti there is overwhelming 
evidence that the American public is poorly informed about international affairs (Holsti, 1992, p. 
450). How then, can the public form this stable and coherent opinion on foreign affairs? Within 
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the public opinion research a much heard mechanism, employed by the public for overcoming 
the lack of information, are heuristics; rules of thumb that enable voters to decide on the basis of 
very limited information (Holsti. 1992; Aldrich et al. 2006). Among these heuristic party 
identification and elite cues are the most influential on the formation of public opinion, as 
information originating from a party that a person belongs to or identifies with is considered as 
being more credible (Baum & Groeling, 2009, p. 181). However, there are also other researchers 
who have come up with alternative ways in which the public can form an opinion, most notably 
their own values, ideals and beliefs (Reifler et al., 2014; Popkin & Dimock, 2000; Kuklinski & 
Quirk, 2000).  The general question of how the public overcomes its general lack of information 
to form a stable an rational opinion on foreign affairs has been answered in several different 
ways, and one can distinguish three main categories of explanations.    
 The first category concerns the heuristics the public can use to form an opinion based on 
the very limited amount of information available, such as elite cues, leader image and party 
identification (Baum & Groeling, 2009). In short; heuristics can be seen as rules of thumb to 
simplify the complex reality and process the available information efficiently in order to make a 
rational decision on the issue at hand. Baum and Groeling state that the public is indeed poorly 
informed when it concerns foreign politics, and instead relies on cues from credible partisan 
sources (Baum & Groeling, 2009, p. 161). According to Gilles & Murawaka (2002) the public 
takes cues from experts and elites because it is costly and time consuming to research the 
complicated, and often distant, topics on their own. The more complex a topic, and thus more 
time consuming to research, such as foreign affairs, the more likely the public is to use heuristics 
(Gilles & Murawaka, 2002, p.19).  
  An important heuristic in connection to elite cues is party identification; a long term 
preference for a certain party and its candidates, or even a sense of belonging to a certain party, 
based on its attitudes or common beliefs (Thomassen & Rosema, 2009 , p. 6). Because of the 
preference for one party, based on previous issues, a person accepts the party position on 
complex issues more easily than other positions, as the preferred party is regarded as a credible 
source in comparison to other parties. This relates closely to the heuristic of elite cues, as the 
credibility of a member or expert from the elite is partly judged on the basis of their party 
membership.   
  The research mentioned above by Baum and Groeling has been conducted in the United 
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States, similar for most of the research in this area. The conclusion that the public makes 
extensive use of heuristics can therefore not immediately be extended to the Netherlands because 
of the difference in political system. Whereas the American political system has led to the 
emergence of only two parties and therefore distinctly polarized elite cues (in most cases), the 
Dutch proportional system has led to a severely fragmented parliament with nine parties at the 
time of the decision to send troops to Uruzgan. The larger number of parties give the voter more 
alternatives to choose from, and may reduce the effect of each individual party and its cues on 
foreign policy.  The effect of the presence of multiple parties on the use of heuristics depends on 
the positions taken by the parties; nine different parties can have anything between one and nine 
different position. Research has indicated that the way the elites are divided, consensus or 
conflict, can have an major impact on the public opinion (Berinsky, 2007; Reifler et al., 2014). If 
elites are more divided and opposed the public can easily distinguish the different cues offered 
by the parties and politician. When there is consensus among the elite, the public finds it difficult 
to side with a certain party, as there is little to choose. 
    The second category of explanations states that the population does not simply parrot the 
messages sent by the elites, but has own core values and can reason about foreign policy 
themselves. For example, they can base their opinion on previous experiences, trust in their 
government and the people they encounter every day, and their knowledge of the political 
institutions (Popkin & Dimock, 2000). This explanation assumes that the public has an internal 
moral compass and uses this besides, or instead of, heuristics in order to form their opinion on 
foreign policy. In the case of international conflict, studies have shown that the desire for 
retribution or punishment, so called “moral reasoning”, is a good indicator for the use of values 
by individuals attitudes towards war. Because of this mechanism, support for issues like the 
death penalty have been used as a proxy to measure this effect (Reifler et al., 2014, p. 33). 
Popkin and Dimock (2000) also challenge the view that the public does not reason about politics 
and is easily influenced by elite messages. The authors argue that citizens have certain 
predispositions apart from their partisanship and ideology, most notably trust and knowledge, 
that allow them to do more than just parrot elite opinions (Popkin & Dimock, 2000, p. 215).  
Because the public can use past experiences and other predispositions as an substitute, 
knowledge of an issue is not essential in forming an own opinion, however, a person with more 
knowledge perceives the word differently. A knowledgeable person can understand complex 
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reasoning and the different positions politician offer in debates on foreign policy. In contrast, a 
person with less knowledge cannot distinguish the different positions and therefore sees the 
outside world as out of control and more dangerous (Popkin & Dimock, 2000, p. 229). In 
comparison to heuristics values are not issue based, but are a constant factor within every 
individual when judging new foreign policy issues.   
  The third explanation models the process by which the public forms their opinion on 
foreign affairs as a cost-benefit analysis (Reifler et al., 2014). The costs and benefits can both be 
personal and general. For example possible casualties (personal) and financial aspects (general) 
can be seen as costs while the probability of success can be seen as a measure of benefits. This 
model assumes that there are rational citizens, and it requires them to have the correct and 
complete information to make such a cost benefit analysis. The classic study of Mueller (1971) 
on the wars in Vietnam and Korea, where the support for the war decreases when 
casualties(costs) increase, is an example of this explanation. However, this explanation has been 
challenged by several researchers, for example by Berinsky. He found little evidence of such cost 
benefit calculations made by the American public during the Second World War when analysing 
data from that time (Berinsky, 2007). Other authors, such as Voogd and Vos (2010) suggest that 
a more nuanced view is needed when reviewing the effects of casualties on the level of public 
support as the context and circumstances of the casualties are a significant factor (Voogd & Vos, 
2010). Factors such as probability of success and legitimacy of the mission play an important 
part in determining the effects of casualties.  
  As mentioned before the level of knowledge of the public is relevant in all three of the 
explanations. If the public is in possession of the complete and correct information concerning a 
certain foreign issue, they do not need to rely on heuristics to form an opinion. As heuristics, 
such as elite and party cues, are a way of forming an opinion based on incomplete knowledge, 
they become obsolete when the public is fully informed (Baum & Groeling, 2009; Gilles & 
Murawaka, 2002). Furthermore, knowledge of specific events and circumstances can influence 
the perception of the international issue, and as a result influence the values the public connects 
to the issue. For example; if the public is not informed of human rights violations during a 
conflict they cannot approve or disapprove of the conflict for that reason.  In addition to 
knowledge on the foreign policy topic itself, knowledge of domestic politics can influence the 
way the public opinion is formed. If the public has little knowledge of the different party 
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positions or the position and identity of politicians, they cannot form their opinion based on these 
heuristics. Therefore both knowledge of domestic politics and knowledge of international politics 
and events can have an effect on the way certain heuristics and values influence the public 
opinion.        
Specific factors in the Dutch case 
All three models of opinion forming have been shown to have some effect in certain cases and of 
various magnitude on public opinion, but not much research has been done on the relative 
importance of each model compared to one another. The research that has been done in the 
United Kingdom showed a minimal influence of heuristics in the case of the use of military force 
in both Afghanistan and Libya (Reifler et al., 2014). As most of the research on these models in 
the context of the Afghan war has taken place outside the Netherlands, most significantly in the 
United states and the United Kingdom, one cannot extend the conclusions of that research 
directly to the case of the Dutch participation in the ISAF mission in Uruzgan. There are several 
factors that can influence the relative importance of each of the models in the Netherlands. 
 First of all the Netherlands has a fragmented political system with, at the time of the 
decision to send Dutch troops to Afghanistan, nine different parties (and two additional 
fractions). As most research has taken place in the United States, with a two party system, this 
might lead to very different results, as the presence of more parties in the Netherlands may have 
an effect on the level of elite conflict. Reifler et al. (2014) suggest that the absence of consensus 
among the elite will increase the importance of heuristics. Berinsky (2007) also views the 
(absence of) elite consensus as an important factor in public opinion concerning international 
conflict. The author suggests that there is a major difference in public opinion when the elite is 
united instead of divided on the issue of war (Berinsky, 2007, p. 986). In the Netherlands not all 
parties had distinctly different positions on the decision to send Dutch troops to Uruzgan, but the 
different parties stressed different aspects of the issue in the debate on the 2nd of February 2006 
(Official transcript of debate retrieved from: officielebekendmakingen.nl). Among the parties 
that supported the deployment of Dutch troops, the VVD, PVDA and CDA all stressed the 
security aspect and the importance of fighting terrorism, while the CDA and the PVDA also 
mentioned the moral obligation to help the people of Afghanistan. This moral obligation was 
also stressed by the SGP and CU, whom because of this, also supported Dutch participation in 
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Uruzgan. The last party that supported the decision to send troops was the LPF, who questioned 
the high financial costs, but nevertheless supported the mission because of the Dutch 
international obligation to do so. The parties that opposed the decision to send Dutch troops to 
Uruzgan, GroenLinks and SP, did so because they objected to the fact that the mission would be 
closely related to the fighting mission conducted by the United States. This mission of the United 
States included the infamous, and morally questionable, torture of prisoners. Furthermore the SP 
stressed that, in their opinion, it would be highly unlikely that the mission would be a success. 
The position of D66 was complex, as its leader opposed the decision to send Dutch troops to 
Afghanistan in the parliamentary debate, but was later forced by the party to step down. He was 
forced to step down because the party disagreed with his objection during the debate, and 
supported the decision to send troops to Uruzgan in the end.  
  As becomes clear from the party positions above, the presence of nine parties does not 
lead to an equal number of positions. The presence of nine parties does lead to different aspects 
of the debate being highlighted by the different parties, giving the supporters of different parties 
various cues if and why they should support the Dutch participation in Uruzgan. However, the 
Dutch elections have become increasingly volatile over the years indicating that fewer voters 
identify on a long-term basis with the position and attitudes of one party, likely decreasing the 
relevance of the party identification component of the heuristic (Dijstelbloem, Hoed, Holtslag & 
Schouten, 2010). Because the Dutch voters are apparently less bound to one party, and therefore 
do not simply copy the position of their preferred party, it can be expected that the Dutch public 
does not rely extensively on heuristics originating from specific partisan sources or cues. The 
effect of the increased volatility is only relevant to the specific position, arguments and cues of 
the parties. The general ideological position of both the voter and the party (for example on the 
well-known left-right scale) has not necessarily changed together with the increased volatility of 
the elections. Even tough voters voted for a different party than last time, they might still vote for 
parties on the same side of the left-right scale.  
  Even tough voters may rely less on cues from a specific party, as they more often switch 
between parties, they may still share the general position of the parties they feel close to, because 
they stand on their side of the political spectrum. From the positions taken by the parties one can 
see that, in general, the parties on the left side opposed the decision, while parties on the right 
supported the deployment of Dutch troops. Therefore, it is expected that respondents who feel 
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connected, via common positions(ideology) or identification, to a right wing party, will support 
the decision to deploy Dutch troops to Uruzgan more than respondents attracted to left wing 
parties. In connection, it is expected that respondents, who place themselves on the right hand 
side of a left right scale, will support the mission in Uruzgan more than those who place 
themselves on the left hand side of the scale.        
  Secondly, research by Everts (2012), into the role of Dutch public opinion in the Iraq 
war, showed that the Dutch public found a mandate from the United Nations, meaning 
international legitimacy, very important When asked whether the respondents thought the 
Netherlands should participate in the invasion of Iraq without a UN mandate support dropped to 
20%, while support for Dutch participation with a UN mandate was 40% (Everts, 2012, p. 96). 
Furthermore, support dropped when reports about torture by the Americans in the Abu Graib 
went public, indicating a moral rejection of torture (Everts, 2012, p. 98). This reveals that values 
of the Dutch population can play an important part in the forming of their public opinion. It is 
therefore expected that the Dutch public makes use of moral reasoning when forming an opinion 
on international issues. When looking at the moral reasoning among the Dutch public it is 
expected, that respondents with a large desire for punishment, retributiveness, will support the 
war in Afghanistan more than respondents who do not desire punishment .       
 Thirdly, the expected costs of Dutch military participation were not extensively debated 
in parliament at the time of the initial decision to send troops to Uruzgan. The mission was 
mainly directed towards rebuilding Uruzgan, instead of fighting. The costs in lives did therefore 
not dominate the debate at that time. In the parliamentary debate of 2nd  February 2006, on the 
participation of the Netherlands in the ISAF mission, the terms “costs” and “casualties” were 
mentioned only once in the entire debate. Research by Voogd and Vos, into public opinion on 
the mission in Uruzgan, indicated that in this case the actual amount of casualties, frequently 
used as an indication of costs, did not have an significant effect on the level of support for the 
mission (Voogd & Vos, 2010, p. 451). The results from earlier research and the absence of 
extensive political debate on the costs of the mission, makes it less likely that the public debates 
the costs, as the public generally is less informed on such complex foreign policy issues than the 
political elite. This leads to the expectation that the cost-benefit model will not be the most 
important factor in the forming of the public opinion in this case.  
  Reviewing the specific aspects that can have an effect on the public opinion in the 
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Netherlands, concerning the decision to send a significant number of troops to Uruzgan, one can 
expect that each of the three models has some effect on the forming of public opinion in this 
case.  
Operationalization and measurement 
In order to investigate the relative importance of these factors, the data form the “Nationaal 
Kiezersonderzoek 2006” (National Voter Survey) will be used (CBS & SKON, 2006). This 
survey contains questions on relevant factors concerning heuristics and values. At the time of the 
election, in 2006, it included the military task force in Uruzgan. The “Nationaal 
Kiezersonderzoek 2006” was conducted over two periods shortly before the elections on the 22nd 
of November 2006 and contained 4000 randomly selected respondents in total.   
 The general support of the public, for sending the Dutch military to Uruzgan in 2006, can 
be measured by the question: “The Netherlands have made a right choice by sending soldiers to 
the Uruzgan province in Afghanistan” (translated). The respondents answered this question on a 
four point scale ranging from totally disagree to totally agree. This will be the dependent variable 
of the research. In the survey, it was not asked why the respondent thought sending Dutch 
soldiers to Afghanistan was either good or bad. It is also important to note that this survey was 
taken several months after the decision to send troops to Uruzgan was made, and so events that 
took place between the political decision and the survey might have had an effect on the results.   
 The heuristics consist of several factors and in order to measure the influence of 
heuristics, one can look at the relation between a respondent and the different parties. The exact 
message and frame of elite cues, and their effect on the individual, will and cannot be measured 
in this study. However, as the literature (Gilles & Murawaka, 2002) indicates that individuals 
form their opinion on the basis of certain cues sooner when identifying with the party the cue 
comes from, as it is a more credible source, it is to be expected that party identification captures 
both factors. However, as stated before, party identification is decreasing in the Netherlands; in 
the NKO only 125 respondents identified strongly with a certain party and is therefore not a 
useful indicator. Instead of party identification, and the absence of a different measure of 
closeness to a party, the sympathy score of the respondents will be used to measure the possible 
partisan effects on the public opinion. When indicating the sympathy for a party the respondent 
likely includes sympathy for the leader of the party and sympathy for the ideas of the party. In 
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the survey, the respondents were asked to score the sympathy for the six major parties on a scale 
ranging from 1 to 10. The parties that were scored were the coalition parties VVD, CDA and 
D66 (which left the coalition on the 29th of June 2006) and the major opposition parties PVDA, 
SP and GroenLinks. I expect to find that respondents with a high sympathy for parties that 
supported the decision to send troops to Uruzgan, the parties VVD and CDA, to also tend to 
support the decision to send troop to Uruzgan. Vice versa I expect sympathizers for PVDA, SP 
and GroenLinks to support the decision to send troops to Uruzgan less. As D66 had an internal 
conflict within the party on this issue, the (former)leader image and party position are opposed to 
each other, and no clear expectation of the effects on sympathizers of this of this party can 
therefore be formulated.          
  In addition to the party preference (identification and closeness), the literature has 
indicated that the level of political knowledge is relevant to the way individuals perceive and 
process cues (Popkin & Dimock, 2000; Wlezien, 1995). In the survey the respondents were 
asked several questions to determine their level of political knowledge, such as identifying 
specific politicians and their function. These questions were scored and combined into one single 
‘political knowledge’ score. This score was focussed on domestic politicians and did not include 
foreign issues. So it can be used in the analysis to see if higher levels of political knowledge lead 
to different levels of support for the mission in Uruzgan or if higher political knowledge will lead 
to a larger effect of partisan factors. In addition to the political knowledge score, the frequency of 
reading articles on foreign issues in the newspaper will be used as an additional measure of 
knowledge, in order to include the effects of knowledge on foreign issues.     
  The values of the public can be measured by looking for evidence of “moral reasoning” 
in the survey. Research by Liberman (2006) has shown that support for the death penalty is a 
good proxy for the support of wars by measuring the level of retributiveness and 
humanitarianism of the respondents. In the National election survey of 2006 the respondent is 
asked to indicate their support for the death penalty. The expectation is that the higher the 
support for the death penalty, and thus higher level of retributiveness of the respondent, the 
higher the support for military action in Uruzgan. However, because the Dutch mission in 
Afghanistan was directed at rebuilding besides security, the mission is not a typical punitive war. 
Therefore the questions: “The Netherlands needs to spend more on foreign aid” and “Illegal 
refugees should be allowed to stay” will be used to more specifically measure the humanitarian 
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values of the respondent. The expectation is that the more the respondent agrees with these two 
statements the higher the level of humanitarianism of the respondent, and therefore supports the 
deployment of the Dutch troops as well.     
  The cost benefit analysis cannot be researched with any validity as no question in the 
survey addresses this topic. In the survey there is no viable proxy for incorporating the two 
factors most commonly used to measure the effect of the costs and benefits, namely casualties 
and perception of mission success (Voogd & Vos, 2010).  Between the start of the mission and 
the date of the survey, four Dutch soldiers died in Afghanistan. As these where not combat 
related deaths, but accidents which could also have taken place in the Netherlands during 
training, they are not likely to be very significantly important to the public opinion (Voogd & 
Vos, 2010, p. 447). It cannot be excluded, it is even likely, that a cost/benefit analysis is used by 
the respondents when answering either the question about sending soldiers to Uruzgan or the 
question on increased spending on foreign aid. However, considering the state of the debate, it is 
not likely that the cost-benefit analysis dominates over either heuristics or values in the questions 
that will be used to test the other factors.      
  Because of data limitations and the absence of relevantly formulated questions in the 
existing surveys, the measure of the morals and cost benefit analysis cannot be completely valid. 
However, the relative influence of heuristics in comparison to the values of the population can be 
researched in the case of the Dutch participation in the ISAF mission.  
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Results 
The general public support for sending soldiers to Uruzgan at the time of the survey was 
generally positive, Figure 1 shows that a majority of 60% agreed with the decision. This is in 
itself interesting as initially the support for sending Dutch troops to Afghanistan was initially 
generally negative (Everts, 2012). There was no significant difference in level of support when 
splitting the sample into a part with high political knowledge and into a part with low political 
knowledge.   
 
Figure 1. Support for sending soldiers to Afghanistan among respondents of the 2006 National 
voter survey. Data from CBS, SKON, Brinkman, M., Kolk, H. van der, Aarts and C.W.A.M., 
Rosema, M. (2007). Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 2006. 
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Table 1 
All factors influencing approval of sending soldiers to Uruzgan, including separate results for 
the level of political knowledge of the respondents.    
 
Full sample 
 
Low political 
knowledge 
High political 
knowledge 
 
        B S.E. B S.E.                  B S.E. 
Constant 1,239 0,124 1,324 0,182 1,139 0,172 
Support for Death 
Penalty 0,031* 0,013 0,035 0,02 0,03 0,017 
Support for 
foreign Aid 0,082** 0,023 0,113* 0,038 0,064* 0,03 
Support for torture 0,003 0,013 0,012 0,022 -0,005 0,017 
Support for 
allowing illegal 
immigrants to stay -0,035 0,022 -0,003 0,035 -0,051 0,029 
Sympathy score 
Pvda 0,002 0,011 -0,017 0,016 0,019 0,014 
Sympathy score 
VVD 0,025* 0,01 0,027 0,017 0,023 0,013 
Sympathy score 
D66 0,013 0,009 0,015 0,015 0,013 0,011 
Sympathy score 
CDA 0,053** 0,011 0,044* 0,017 0,059** 0,014 
Sympathy score 
SP -0,057** 0,01 -0,044* 0,016 -0,067** 0,014 
Sympathy score 
GroenLinks 0,001 0,011 -0,011 0,018 0,011 0,015 
Left-right self-
rating 0,007 0,01 -0,006 0,015 0,018 0,014 
N = 2623                    N = 1161        N = 1462 
R² = 0.311       R² = 0.275         R² = 0.339 
* p ≤ 0.05    ** p ≤ 0.001 
Data from CBS, SKON, Brinkman, M., Kolk, H. van der, Aarts and C.W.A.M., Rosema, M. 
(2007). Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 2006. 
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The result from the regression analysis, with separate results for both low and high domestic 
political knowledge, are shown in Table 1. Collinearity statistics showed no problems. Results 
from the full sample indicate significant positive effects for the factors support for the death 
penalty, support for increasing foreign aid, the sympathy score for the VVD and the sympathy 
score for the CDA. The only significant negative effect indicated was the sympathy score for the 
SP. The results indicate that partisan factors have an effect on the support for the mission in 
Uruzgan. The effects found are in line with the party positions, as the VVD and CDA supported 
the decision to send troops to Uruzgan and the SP opposed the decision. These results also 
indicate that moral reasoning was present among the Dutch public. In this case the desire for 
punishment leads to higher support for the decision to send Dutch troop to Uruzgan. In addition, 
the humanitarian feelings of the respondents, measured by the support for increasing spending on 
foreign aid, also seem to lead to higher support for the mission.  
  When splitting the sample on basis of knowledge on domestic politics, several effects 
change in size and significance. In both the analysis including respondents with low political 
knowledge and the analysis including respondents with high political knowledge, the support for 
increasing foreign aid and the sympathy score for the CDA have an significant positive effect. 
The results also indicate a significant negative effect for the sympathy score for the SP, while the 
support for the death penalty and the sympathy score for the VVD are no longer significant.  
 Even though the same factors are indicated to have a significant effect in both analysis, 
the magnitude of the effects differs. The effect of support for increasing foreign aid is larger in 
the group with low domestic political knowledge than in both the full sample and in the group 
with high political knowledge. The partisan effects are larger for the group with high political 
knowledge that for the full sample and the group with low political knowledge.     
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Table 2 
All factors influencing approval of sending soldiers to Uruzgan, including separate results for 
the frequency of reading about foreign news.    
 
Full sample 
 
Seldom or never 
reads foreign news  
Frequently reads 
foreign new 
 
        B S.E. B S.E.                  B S.E. 
Constant 1,239 0,124 1,033 0,194 1,155 0,185 
Support for Death 
Penalty 0,031* 0,013 0,059* 0,02 0,020 0,019 
Support for 
foreign Aid 0,082** 0,023 0,025* 0,036 0,107* 0,035 
Support for torture 0,003 0,013 0,044* 0,021 -0,017 0,019 
Support for 
allowing illegal 
immigrants to stay -0,035 0,022 -0,011 0,034 -0,058 0,032 
Sympathy score 
Pvda 0,002 0,011 0,025 0,016 -0,003 0,016 
Sympathy score 
VVD 0,025* 0,01 0,023 0,016 0,014 0,015 
Sympathy score 
D66 0,013 0,009 0,029 0,013 0,016 0,013 
Sympathy score 
CDA 0,053** 0,011 0,032 0,016 0,079** 0,016 
Sympathy score 
SP -0,057** 0,01 -0,053* 0,016 -0,064** 0,015 
Sympathy score 
GroenLinks 0,001 0,011 -0,06 0,018 0,021 0,017 
Left-right self-
rating 0,007 0,01 0.025 0,016 0,006 0,015 
N = 2623               N = 1161        N = 1462 
R² = 0.311       R² = 0.317         R² = 0.341 
* p ≤ 0.05    ** p ≤ 0.001 
Data from CBS, SKON, Brinkman, M., Kolk, H. van der, Aarts and C.W.A.M., Rosema, M. 
(2007). Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, NKO 2006.  
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The regression analysis was also conducted with the sample split on the level foreign news 
readership. The results in Table 2 show that among the respondents who seldom or never read 
foreign news, the factors support for the death penalty, support for increasing foreign aid and the 
support for torture have significant positive effects. The sympathy score for the SP is the only 
negative effect indicated. Among the respondents who frequently read foreign news the support 
for foreign aid and the sympathy score for the CDA have significant positive effects, while the 
sympathy score for the SP has an significant negative effect.  
  The effect of the support for increasing foreign aid is larger in the sample of respondents 
who frequently read foreign news than in the full sample and in the sample of respondents who 
seldom or never read foreign news. Also the effects of the partisan factors are larger in the group 
with high readership of foreign news than in the group with low readership of foreign news in 
the newspapers.  
  When comparing the data from Table 1 and Table 2 it can be observed that higher 
knowledge of both domestic politics and of foreign issues leads to larger effects of the partisan 
factors. The effects of the sympathy score for the parties is in line with the party positions as 
observed in the debate on the mission to Uruzgan in 2006. It is not surprising that higher 
knowledge of domestic politics leads to a larger effect of partisan factors, as the public needs to 
be able to identify and take note of the different party positions in order for the partisan factors to 
have effect. Also the knowledge of foreign issues, measured by reading about foreign issues in 
the newspapers, leads to partisan factors having a larger effect. This might be due to the fact that 
individuals with higher knowledge on an issue can more easily follow the different arguments 
offered by the elites on a topic (Popkin & Dimock, 2000, p. 229).  
  Among the proxies used to measure the values of the respondents only the support for 
increasing the spending on foreign aid is significant in all categories of political knowledge 
levels and foreign news readership. In this case the effect of support for increasing spending on 
foreign aid is larger in the part of the sample with low domestic political knowledge than in the 
part of the sample with high political knowledge. When analysing the same factor with the 
sample split on knowledge on foreign issues the opposite seems to be indicated; the effect of 
support for  increasing spending on foreign aid is larger among the part of the sample that 
frequently reads about foreign news than among the part of the sample that seldom or never 
reads about foreign news. Assuming that individuals who read more about foreign issues are also 
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more interested in these issues, it is logical that the effect of the support for increasing foreign 
aid is larger among them than among those who are not as interested in foreign issues.               
Conclusion 
The statistical analysis indicates that both heuristics and values have effects on public opinion in 
this case, although both small. Among the heuristics partisan factors have an effect on public 
opinion, in line with the party positions. Respondent who sympathize with parties that supported 
the decision to send troops to Uruzgan also tended to support the decision more themselves and 
supporters of parties that opposed the decision also tended to oppose the decision more. This 
effect was indicated for all different portions of the sample, both in the parts of the sample with 
high and low political knowledge and also both in the part of the sample with frequent or little 
readership of foreign issues in the newspapers. However, the effects were largest in the part of 
the sample with high political knowledge and in the part of the sample with frequent readership 
op foreign issues in the newspapers. This suggests that, as indicated in the literature, a higher 
level of knowledge enables respondents to interpret the different arguments the parties offer 
better than the respondents with a lower level of knowledge. Also the presence of elite conflict 
may have led to partisan factors being relevant, as suggested by Reifler et al. (2014) and 
Berinsky (2007). 
  It is difficult to distinguish between heuristics and the possible correlating predispositions 
of the party and the sympathisers of the party. It is possible that supporters of a party come to the 
same conclusion as the party itself independently, without consulting the party position, thus not 
using heuristics. However, even individuals with a high level of knowledge, both on domestic 
and foreign issues, are not likely to always be able to, or willing to, research every issue and 
form their own opinion because this would be very time consuming and costly. It is therefore 
probable that both heuristics and the correlation of conclusions reached by the supporters of a 
party and the party itself are present in this sample.   
  Among the values, desires of retributiveness and humanitarianism both have effects in 
the full sample, albeit small, on the public attitudes towards the decision to send Dutch troop to 
Afghanistan. The mixed positive and negative effects found from the variables to test for 
retributiveness and humanitarianism can be explained by the equally mixed nature of the Dutch 
mission in Uruzgan. Even though the mission was directed at rebuilding the province, there was 
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a significant chance of violent encounters with insurgents. As expected the higher the support for 
the death penalty, measuring the punitive sentiments of the respondents, the higher the support 
for the mission to Uruzgan. Also the higher the support for increased spending on foreign aid, 
measuring the humanitarianism of the respondents,  the higher the support for the mission to 
Uruzgan. When splitting the sample into a part with high political knowledge and a part with low 
political knowledge only the support for increased spending on foreign aid remained significant. 
The results indicate that the effect of this factor is larger among those with lower political 
knowledge than among those with high political knowledge. When splitting the sample on basis 
of foreign issue knowledge the opposite seems to be true.     
Discussion 
When reviewing the Dutch military participation in the ISAF mission in the Afghan province of 
Uruzgan it is important for policy makers and the government to understand the public opinion 
and its effects. By understanding the ways in which public opinion is formed policy makers can 
try to influence the opinion or incorporate the public opinion into their decision. A lot of research 
has been done to explain the connection between the political elite, foreign policy and the public 
opinion. The three most researched mechanisms by which public opinion can be formed are 
heuristics, values and cost-benefit analysis. By using data from the National voter survey 
(Nationaal kiezersonderzoek) of 2006, the influence of both heuristics and values on the public 
support for sending troops to Uruzgan has been researched.  
  As there is no single dataset concerning this case that includes all three of the 
mechanisms of heuristics, values and cost-benefit analysis it was not possible to research the 
relative importance of each of the categories. In this analysis it was impossible to include the 
cost-benefit analysis as the data was not available in a survey that also included the heuristics 
and values of the respondents. Therefore it may be necessary for future researchers to conduct 
their own survey in order to gather all relevant data in a single dataset. For relevant research into 
the cost-benefit analysis of the Dutch public in the case of Uruzgan see Voogd and Vos (2010). 
However, the proxy used to measure the humanitarian feelings of the respondents, support for 
increasing spending on foreign aid, includes the costs and enables the respondents to answer the 
question using a cost-benefit analysis. It is not unlikely that a part of the sample used the cost-
benefit analysis besides, or instead of, using values in order to determining their opinion.  
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  It is also important to note that the effects of the media and framing are not taken into 
account in this analysis, as they could not be established from the available survey data. In this 
analysis the link between party positions and respondents attitudes was, apart from the 
knowledge level, investigated without considering the way the media portrayed the different 
parties and the debate on the issue. Similarly, the way the media portrayed the nature of the 
conflict was not analysed in this research.   
  It is important for policy makers and politicians to realize that in this case both internal 
values of the respondents and partisan factors played a role in forming the public opinion. Also 
important is the conclusion that the level of knowledge can have a significant effect on these 
partisan factors and values. The recommendation by the government commission to create a 
good media strategy in order to create larger support for future missions seems to be a good 
recommendation on the basis of the results of this analysis. It can be added that this strategy 
should focus on informing the respondents on the events during the mission in order to enlarge 
the effects of moral reasoning. Also the state of the elite consensus/conflict needs to be taken 
into account when trying to create public support, as elite conflict seems to enlarge the effects of 
the partisan factors.      
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